Wellington, aliatuen (España, Inglaterra eta Portugal) armadako burua zen, 1813ko abuztuan, ehun mila soldadu zituen Irun eta Donostia artean eta 1813-8-31n Donostia suntsitu zuen, guztia lapurtu, neska emakume gehienak bortxatu, 500 etxe nahita erre, donostiarrak zauritu eta erail, erasoan eta ondorioz ia bi mila donostiar hil ziren, genozidio ikaragarria.
1813-7-25ean Wellingtonek Donostia aurreneko aldiz asaldatu zuenean bazekien Castaños jeneral españolaren agindua zutela “pasar a cuchillo a todos los donostiarras y quemar la ciudad”, baina franstsesek eutsi eta ez zuten lortu, hilabete beranduago egin zuten.
Wellington-ek idatzi zion Castaños jeneral españolari 1813-9-3an:
“La prise de San Sebastián est une bonne affaire.»
Wellington Lesakan zegoen, 1813ko uztaila eta abuztuan askotan etorri zen Donostiara (10 aldiz), oso ondo ezagutzen zuen eta genozidioa babestu zuen; sarraskiaren ostean, frantsesak salatu zituen (Francok Gernika bezala), ez zuen onartu eta inoiz ez zuen laguntzarik eman. Zubietan 1813-9-8an eskaini zioten Donostia osoa baina ez zuen gupidarik izan. Laster Donostiako udalari erantzun zion ez zuela ezer gehiago jakin nahi Donostiari buruz, baina sarraskiak jarraitu zion.
1813-9-27an “El duende los cafées” egunkarian 1813ko Donostiako sarraskiaren salaketak argitaratu zirenean, Wellingtonek informatzaileak epaitu arazi zituen, absolbituak atera zirelarik egia zelako, Donostiako 79 lekukoek eta udaleko 1814ko Manifestuek kontatu zuten bezala.
Wellington-en laguntzaileak Graham (ingelesa), Alava eta Castaños (Freyre) jeneral españolak.
Wellingtonek agintzen zituen ehun mila soldadu aliatuekin inguratuta zegoen Donostia eta suntsitu zuten, erasoan eta ondorioz bi mila donostiarrek bizia galdu zuten, 200 urte igaro dira baina izen hauek Donostian ez dira ahaztu.
Wellington – Castaños 1813-9-3: «Vous aurez appris avec plaisir la conduite et les succésde votre ancienne armée de la Gallee. Je lui ai fait battre Soult
foute setile. Les Anglais n’ont pas tiré un seul coup de ce cóté la.
La prise de San Sebastián est une bonne affaire.»
Gomez Arteche jenerala bere liburuan Guerra de la independencia 1808-1814. José Gómez Arteche tomo XIV pág 250-400, Madrid 1868, 340 kapituluan.
Wellington-ek defendatu zuen Castaños jenerala beti eta IV. armadaren burua aldatu zutenean 1813-8-12an Castaños / Freire, Wellingtonek aliatuen armada buru izaten jarraitzeko bere dimisioa aurkeztu zuen, erregentziak onartu zuena 1813-9-22an.
1813-8-31n Wellingtonek Castañosen agindua bete zuen “donostiar guztiak garbitu eta hiria kiskali“. S. Martzialen ere Espainiako IV. armada, Freire buru zela, bakarrik utzi zuen borrokatzen Soult-en 24 mila soldadu frantsesen aurka, Wellingtonek aginduta ingelesek ez zuten tirorik bota, berak kontatu zuen.
Wellingtonen Dispatches 1813. urtekoak, zerikusirik dutenak Donostiarekin, X. eta XI. bolumenak, sarean daude jakina gutun batzuk:
Dispatches Wellington 1808-1813 (vol X)
Dispatches Wellington 1813 (Vol XI)
1813an Cadiz-ko liberalek Castaños (eta Giron) kendu zutela 1812ko
Espainiako konstituzioaren aurka zegoelako eta inkisizioa kentzearen
aurka. Beste intrigak ere badaude jakina, Juan O’Donoj’u liberalarekin izan zuen afera, kontsebadoreek Wellington nahi ote zuten Espainiako errege izendatu Cadiz-ko 1812ko konstituzioaren aurka.
Freyre jenerala Castaños-gatik aldatzea, politikan goi mailako erabakia
izan zen, Wellingtonek oso gogor defendatu zuen Castaños, nahiz eta
azkenean etsi, eta ia izan zituen ondorioak España-Inglaterra
harremanetan eta zalantzan jarri zuen ere, Wellington beraren
zuzendaritza aliatuen armadan, dimisioa emanez 1813-8-30ean, erregentziak onartua 1813-9-22an (Begira gutuna, Sir Henry Wtlleslry to
Don Juan O’Donoj’u. Sre, Cadiz, 28th July, 1813 eta ondorenak)
Wellingtonek lortu zuen Castaños-Freyre aldaketa atzeratzea eta Castaños
zen Espainiako IV. armada burua 1813-7-25ean, aliatuek Donostia lehen
aldiz asaldatu zutenean eta agindu zuenean “pasar a cuchillo a todos los
donostiarras y quemar la ciudad.”
Castaños – Freyre aldaketa Espainiako IV. armada agintean, 1813ko abuztuaren 12an egin zuten.
Wellingtonek Espainiako armadan buru dimisioa eman zuen 1813-8-30ean eta erregentziak onartu zion hilabetera 1813-9-22an, nahiz eta jarraitu zuen
Wellington, mendekatu zen (Freyre eta Cadiz-ko gobernuarekin), San
Martzialen abuztuaren 31n, Freyre (armada española eta Gipuzkoako
tertzioak) bakarrik utzi zuen borrokatzen Soult-en armadaren aurka,
ingelesek ez zuten tirorik bota, nahiz eta irabazi zuten. Wellingtonek sarraskia egin zuen Donostian 1813-8-31n eta osteko egunetan.
Wellingtonek Castañosi 1813-9-3: “Vous aurez appris avec plaisir la
conduite ct les succes de votre ancienne armt’c de la Galice. Jc l’ai
fait battre Soult toute seule. Les Anglais n’ont pas tire un seul coup
de ce cote-la. La prise de San Sebastian est une bonne affaire.”
Abuztuaren 31n, Wellington, Graham, Alava eta Freyre-Castaños jeneralek
(ehun mila soldadu aliatu Donostia-Irun artean), Donostia suntsitu
zuten.
Wellingtonen gutun batzuk 1813ko “dispatches”-etatik
kopiatuta.
Bight Hon. Sir Henry WeUeslty to General the Marquess of Wellington.
My DEAR ABTHUR, Cadiz, 15th July, 1813.
As soon as I had received your letter of the 3rd instant, with its
enclosures, I called together the persons therein mentioned, and read
its contents to them. I afterwards communicated to them the Minister of
War’s letters to you, with your reply. I then apprised them of what had
passed between me, the Minister of War, M. Labrador, and M. Agar, as
stated in my letter to you of the 17th June.
Having made these communications to them, I observed that although I had
been assured by M. Agar and by the Minister of War that the motives for
the recall of General Castanos and General Giron had been made known to
you, yet a perusal of the Minister of War’s letters would show that not
one syllable had been said upon that subject. That if the motives had
been fairly stated to you, and that he had been recalled in a regular
manner, I was persuaded that although you might have lamented it on
account of the public service, you would not have opposed the wishes of
the government. But admitting that there were really motives for the
recall of General Castanos, and that the government had only been guilty
of an omission in having neglected to apprise you of them, I desired to
know in what manner they could justify the appointments of General Lacy
and General Freyre without consulting you, which was a manifest breach
of the conditions upon which you consented to accept the command. That
you had come to Cadiz for no other reason than to arrange these
conditions, and that you considered them so necessary to the exercise of
the command, that in your correspondence upon the subject you positively
declined accepting it unless it were judged expedient to grant them to
you.
M. Arguelles replied that he had no influence over, nor no communication
with the government, and that any information which reached him heJuly,
1813. RECALL OP GENS. CASTANOS AND GIRON. 85
[graphic]obtained more through general report than in any other way.
That he was extremely concerned for what had passed, and that he
deprecated your resignation; but that you had put them to a cruel
alternative, if they were to decide between that and allowing General
Castanos to continue in his command. That it was notorious that General
Castanos was an active opposer of the measures of the Cortes; that he
(Arguelles) knew it when he was here with you, having been apprised of
all his conversations and proceedings at Seville; and that nothing but
his respect and consideration for you would have prevented him upon that
occasion from making a motion in the Cortes, insisting upon the
enforcement of the law by which councillors of State are precluded from
holding any other situation, and which would, of necessity, have
compelled General Castanos to have remained at the seat of the
government. That the state of Spain required prompt and active measures
on the part of the government, and particularly that the agents employed
should be in its confidence. That he lamented extremely that the Regents
had not communicated with you as they ought to have done previously to
taking the measures which they thought necessary, but that he was
persuaded that nothing disrespectful was meant towards you personally,
and that the many sacrifices which you had made in support of the cause
would, he hoped, induce you to pardon what had passed, and to continue
in the command, upon a consideration of the mischievous effects which
would be produced by your resignation of it. M. Arguelles, in the course
of a long speech, wandered so much from the point in discussion, that I
was frequently obliged to bring him back to it. I observed to him that I
was not pleading the cause of General Castanos, but that I was
complaining of the violation of the conditions upon which alone you
consented to accept the command; and that unless a proper reparation
were made to you by the Regency, and a pledge given to you that the same
thing would not happen again, I had no doubt that you would resign.
The next day I saw M. Ciscar (the deputy), whom I found much more
rational than either Arguelles or the Conde de Torreno. He entirely
disapproved the conduct of the government, but said that he was
persuaded that nothing personal towards you was intended. He likewise
disapproved the conduct of Castanos, who, he informed me among other
things, is known to have declared that he would not excite the people to
insurrection, but that if they called for him he would place himself at
their head. He said he would speak to his brother and see me again, and
I hope I shall see him in the course of to-day.
I have since seen the Minister of War and M. Cano Manuel, at present at
the head of the Foreign department, M. Labrador having been turned out
for the reasons stated in the enclosed letter. The Minister of War said
he was certain that nothing but a new arrangement would satisfy the
Regency, and that you had expressed yourself to him, when he was with
you at Freneda, to be willing to accede to a new arrangement. I
concluded my conversation with him by saying that you had never said one
word to me of your readiness to make a new arrangement, but that if any
new proposal was to be made, I recommended that reparation should first
be made to you for what had passed, and security given to you that the
same thing would not happen again.
I was very glad to have an opportunity of conversing with M. Cano
Manuel, because he is much in the confidence of the Regency. After
repeating to him nearly what I had said to M. Arguelles, I observed that
it might happen at no very distant period that the present Regency would
be turned out, and other persons of different principles appointed to
the government. That I would suppose, for argument’s sake, that the
officers appointed by the present Regency would gain your confidence;
but that the moment their successors came into office their object
would, of course, be to remove from their employments all those who had
been instrumental in carrying into effect measures which they
disapproved. The consequence would be, that there would be a perpetual
succession of General officers in the interests of the different
governments, to the utter destruction of the army, and that nothing
proved more the necessity of the conditions upon which you had insisted
than the circumstance which I had stated, which might be expected to
happen in the course of the different changes which would probably take
place.
M. Cano Manuel insisted that the state of Gallicia required prompt and
decisive measures, and, above all, that a General officer should be
appointed to command there who would do his utmost to carry them into
effect. He assured me that he would make a faithful report to the
Regency of what I had stated to him, and would take an early opportunity
of informing me of the result.
16th July.
Since I began this letter I have seen Mexia, Felice, Salazar, Arispe,
and other deputies, and I am assured that this business will immediately
be taken up in the Cortes. I therefore beg that you will suspend
everything until you hear from me again, but I send this letter in order
that you may be apprised of what has passed.
The Minister of War is extremely ill, and it is reported that he is to
go out.
I have not time to send you a copy of the letter respecting Labrador’s
dismissal from office. The whole correspondence relative to the dispute
between Russia and Spain for the right of precedence was referred to the
Cortes, with a report from Labrador, in which he thought proper to
accuse the British government of having been the sole cause of the
dispute. The Cortes have conceded the point to the Emperor, and
intimated to the Regency that they were sorry to see the Foreign
Department in such bad hands, upon which Labrador was instantly
dismissed. It is this dispute that has prevented the arrival of the
Russian Minister, and I should not be surprised if it were to have some
influence over the Emperor in making a separate peace, if such a measure
should be in his contemplation. The misunderstanding is entirely owing
to Labrador’s obstinacy, and I own I have some doubt of the steadiness
of his principles.
Ever, my dear Arthur, most affectionately yours,
H. Wellesley
Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.
My Lord, War Department, London, 22nd July, 1813.
I have the honour of enclosing, for your Lordship’s information, the
copy of a despatch addressed to Sir Henry Wellesley by Lord Viscount
Castlereagh, together with an enclosure. They contain a strong
remonstrance on the part of the British government against the measures
recently taken by the Spanish government to recall General Castafios and
General Girou from their respective situations under your Lordship’s
personal command.
As this measure has been adopted without any previous reference to your
Lordship, they thereby violate the conditions on which alone, with the
full concurrence of the Spanish government, your Lordship accepted the
command of the Spanish armies.
Under a full persuasion that the Spanish government will be eager to
demonstrate their unqualified confidence in the officer who has, at
their express desire, charged himself with the responsible trust of
commanding the Spanish forces, I am commanded by the Prince Regent to
instruct your Lordship to suspend the execution of any orders you may
have received for the recall of these distinguished officers till the
further pleasure of the Spanish government is signified thereupon.
I have the honour to be
Your Lordship’s most obedient humble servant,
Bathtjbst.
[enclosures.]
I.
Viscount Castlereagh to the Sight Eon. Sir Henry Wellesley.
Brat, Foreign Office, 22nd July, 1813.
Your despatches have been received and laid before the Prince Regent.
His Royal Highness approves of the judicious remonstrances made by your
[ocr errors]Excellency upon the recent infraction of the conditions npon
which the Marquess of Wellington accepted the command of the Spanish
armies.
Upon a question so important to the success of the campaign, and so
essential, in the eyes of the whole nation and army, to the military
authority of the Commander in Chief, His Majesty’s government must
suppose that the decision of removing General Castanos and General
Giron, without reference to the Marquess of Wellington, has been taken
without a due consideration of the ruinous effects which a measure of
this nature is calculated to produce.
Under a full persuasion that the Spanish government will be eager to
demonstrate their unqualified confidence in the officer who has, at
their express desire, charged himself with the responsible trust of
commanding the Spanish forces, the Prince Regent has been pleased to
signify his orders to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington that he
should suspend the execution of any orders he may have received for the
recall of these distinguished officers till the further pleasure of the
Spanish government is signified thereupon.
This order is given in the full confidence that, unless the Marquess of
Wellington should think fit to dispense with their services, the Spanish
government will not disturb a system of command under which the
character of the national troops has so recently acquired the highest
distinction; and your Excellency will present an official note of the
enclosed tenor, representing, on the part of the Prince Regent, that His
Royal Highness considers the fate of Spain to depend on the Allied
armies being permitted to act under the undivided command of one
General, sustained by the avowed and unqualified support of the
respective governments.
I am, &c„
Castlereagh. ir.
The Prince Regent having heard with the deepest regret and surprise
that, in the midst of a campaign commenced under the most flattering
auspices for the deliverance of the Peninsula, the Spanish government
have taken measures for removing Generals Castanos and Giron from their
situations on the Staff of the army under the Marquess of Wellington’s
personal command, without any communication with the Field Marshal, and
in direct contravention of the express stipulations entered into when he
was called upon by a decree of the Cortes to assume the chief command of
the Spanish armies, loses not a moment in directing the undersigned to
remonstrate in the most energetic manner against a measure destructive
of all confidence, and obviously subversive of the Marquess of
Wellington’s essential military authority.
The high sense of honour with which the government of Spain is known to
observe all its public engagements, and the evident impossibility of the
Marquess of Wellington’s fulfilling the important trust to which he has
been expressly called by the government of Spain if his authority is not
upheld. His Royal Highness doubts not, will at once determine that
government to recall the orders referred to, if not already done.
The undersigned is commanded to signify that, in the confident
persuasion that the Spanish government could not for a moment hesitate
in rendering this act of justice, as well to the Commander in Chief as
to themselvos, the Prince Regent has directed the Marquess of Wellington
to suspend the execution of the measure in question till the pleasure of
the Spanish government shall have been declared upon the representation
which the undersigned is now commanded to make, and which His Royal
Highness is confident will correspond with those principles of
friendship which so happily unite the feelings as well as the interests
of the two nations.
July, 1813. DELAY IN SENDING BATTERING TRAIN. 109 Earl Bathurst to Field
Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.
My DEAR Lord, Downing Street, 22nd July, 1813.
I hope you will see no objection in obeying my instruction to suspend
the recall of Generals Castarios and Giron until the effect of our
remonstrance is known. If you ask me by what authority I can give you
instruction to this effect, I shall be much puzzled to answer you; but I
depend upon your reputation in the Peninsula, and the little estimation
in which the Spanish Regency is held, for your not having any difficulty
in the business. After your splendid success they dare not resist, and
their submission will go a great way to overthrow them. Your Lordship’s
private letter to me on this subject has given us all the information
almost which it was the object of my letter to you, written ten days
ago, to procure.
Believe me to be, my dear Lord, yours sincerely,
Bathurst.
The Right Hon. Sir Henry Welkshy to General the Marquess of Wellington.
My Dear Arthur, Cadiz, 24th July, 1813.
Since my last letters to you I have received despatches from England
which render it impossible to support the pretensions of the Princess of
Brazil under any conditions whatever. It appears first, that the Prince
if she were appointed Regent of Spain, would not allow her to leave the
Brazils; and by a letter from her agent here which Lord Strangford has
seen, that he is in communication with the “agents of France,” who had
told him that the recognition of the Princess’s claims might very likely
be obtained from Buonaparte.
Under these circumstances Lord Castlereagh has desired me to express the
Prince Regent’s disapprobation of her nomination to the Regency, if
there should be any probability of its taking place.
Ever, my dear Arthur, most affectionately yours,
H. Wellesley.
77i< Sight Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley to General the Marquess of
Wellington.
My Dear Arthur, Cadiz, 24th July, 1813.
The postscript to my last letter will have informed you that some of our
friends in the Cortes meant to take up the question relative to your
command. On the 22nd a Mr. Amat stated his intention to move for the
correspondence which had passed between you and the government upon this
subject. He was immediately attacked by the Liberales, who insisted upon
it that the discussion should be in a public session, and they became so
violent that the President broke up the session, and reserved to himself
the naming of a future day for the discussion of the question. There
were at least two-thirds of the Cortes in favour of Mr. Amat’s motion,
but such is their terror of the Liberales and of the populace that not
one deputy rose to support him.
It is evidently the object of the Serviles and of the Americans to make
use of this question in order to get rid of the government. The
Liberales are determined to support the government, and their object is
to discuss the question in public, in order that they may have the
support of the mob. They would then endeavour to make it appear that
General Castanos was an enemy to the Constitution, and a supporter of
those of the clergy who had resisted the decree for the abolition of the
Inquisition, and that the sole object of the motion was to support him.
The result of the discussion would therefore probably be the ruin of
General Castanos.
You will observe that all this has nothing to do with yon. I still
believe that every individual in the Cortes is anxious that you should
retain the command; but they will not separate this question from others
in which the parties have opposite interests.
Upon reflecting, therefore, upon the turn which the debate had taken in
the Cortes, and that although the question might be carried the
Liberates would be against it, who were the principal promoters of your
appointment to the command, I determined to make another effort through
the Minister of War to obtain some explanation from the Regency which
should satisfy you, and to desire our friends in the Cortes if possible
to prevent the question from being brought forward again.
I saw the Minister of War yesterday; and after adverting to what had
passed in the Cortes, I told him that I would not suffer the opinion to
go abroad that you were merely pleading the cause of General Castanos,
neither would I allow you to be made the tool of a party for the removal
of the government. That you had very justly complained of the violation
in a variety of instances of the conditions under which you had
consented to accept the command ; that you expected that some
satisfactory reason should be assigned for it; and that if the Regency
thought that an adherence to these conditions was incompatible with the
administration of public affairs, they had only to explain the reasons,
and to propose a new arrangement, when it would be for you to decide
whether you could exercise the command with advantage to the service
under any conditions short of those upon which you now hold it.
General O’Donoju replied that you would receive the answer of the
Regency by Colonel Croqueubourg. That the recall of General Castaiios
was not to be dispensed with, but that all the reasons for it could not
be explained to you until his arrival. That General Giron would be
allowed to remain with the Gallician army. That the motives for the
appointment of General Lacy had been communicated to you; and that
General Freyre had been sent under a conviction that his appointment
would be approved by you. That the Regency were only bound by the
conditions which had been agreed to by the Cortes, and that those they
would religiously keep; but that they were not bound by those which had
been entered into by the last Regency, and that there were two which
they thought incompatible with the due administration of affairs, viz.,
the removal and appointment of officers. That you would be written to
upon this subject, and would be requested to propose an arrangement upon
a new basis.
Before I took leave of General O’Donoju I observed to him that I wished
to be satisfied upon one point before I wrote to you. That I had been
assured that the Regents, Messrs. Agar and Ciscar, were desirous that
you should resign the command, and that this was the foundation of all
the proceedings of which you complained; and I desired to know from him,
as a man of honour, whether it was or was not so. He assured me upon his
honour that they entertained no such sentiments. On the contrary, that
if it were to he a question whether you should resign or continue to
hold the command under the present conditions, they would request you to
continue in the command, and would themselves resign their offices, lie
repeated this several times, adding that your resignation would be
ruinous to the cause, both in Spain and the rest of Europe.
July, 1813. RECALL OP GEN. CASTANOS. 117
I told the Minister of War that I was ready to accompany him to the
Regency, and state to them what I had stated to him. He said he did not
think that such a step would be advisable at present, as my motive might
be misconstrued. He said that a day or two after the letters of which
Colonel Croquenbourg is to be the bearer were despatched he would
communicate them to me. Upon my asking him whether there was any
objection to showing them to me now, he said that it would not be
regular to do so, but assured me upon his honour that they contained
exactly what he had stated to me in conversation.
The discussion in the Cortes has at least produced these good effects,
that the Minister of War has been more explicit, and that there appears
to be a more conciliatory disposition in the Regency than was before
perceptible. I do most sincerely hope that their letters will be so far
satisfactory to you that you will consent to remain in the command. It
is the only bond of union between the British and Spanish armies, and
perhaps the principal one between the two nations; and I really think
that your resignation would be almost fatal to the cause.
Ever, my dear Arthur, most affectionately yours,
H. Wellesley.
27k Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley to Field Marshal the Marquess of
Wellington.
Mt DEAR Arthur, Cadiz, 31st July, 1813.
The day after the departure of Colonel Croquenbourg the Minister of War
called at my house and left a copy of his letter to you. As it was by no
means conformable to the tenor of his conversation with me, and could in
no way be deemed satisfactory, I addressed a letter to him, of which a
copy is enclosed. My letter, it seems, has given him great offence, and
he has thought proper to consider it as official. He accordingly sent
Dr. Curtis to me with a note addressed to him, of which a copy is
likewise enclosed, as well as my reply addressed to the Doctor. I toM
Dr. Curtis besides, that so far from wishing to have any private
communication with the Minister of War, I could haTe none whatever until
he made me nn apology; and I believe Curtis hinted this to him, as he
came the next morning and told me that the Minister of War had desired
him to assure roe that he meant no offence to me, and that he would read
my letter over seam as a private one. I have not beard anything of him
since. He probably is angry because he knows that my letter contains
facts which it is impossible for him to contradict. So much lying,
shuffling, and meanness I have never yet had to contend with.
1 have received your letter of the 24th, and will do as you desire. I
have no hope, however, of beiug able to make any impression upon the
government or upon the Minister of War. The government is supported by
all the dubs in the town, which are composed of all the turbulent
spirits and all the needy adventurers in the place, and their sole
object is mischief. These people would rejoice if you were to resign the
command, and their next attempt would be to place General Ballesteros at
the head of the army; but tliere is not a respectable man in the place
who would not consider your resignation as destructive of the cause, and
1 still hope that a – • iti a of the injuri us effects which it would
produce will induce you to retain the command, at least till the end of
the campaign.
1 send you a letter from La Vega which 1 think very sensible. There is
no doubt, I think, that if the question were to come before the Cortes
in the way he suggests, every thing would be settled satisfactorily.
Ever, my dear Arthur, most affectionately yours,
H Welleslev.
[enclose R: s.]
i.
The RU/kt lion. Sir Henry Wtlleslry to Don Juan O’Donoj’u.
Sre, Cadiz, 28th July, 1813.
I am very sorry I did not happen to be at home yesterday when you did me
the honour to call at my house. I will own to you, however, that the
letter which you had the goodness to leave for my perusal is not what,
from our last conversation, I was taught to expect It does not convey to
Lord Wellington any explanation of what has pissed: it merely contains
some complaints of the conduct of the General officers commanding corps,
to which it is required of his Lordship to apply a remedy hy a new
arrangement.
Lord Wellington is informed in your letter that the present Regency
never subscribed to certain conditions under which he holds the command.
The nomination of Lord Wellington to the commaml was the spontaneous act
of the Cortes. He came to Cadiz for no other purpose than to arrange the
conditions under which he was to exercise it, stating his determination
to decline the acceptance of it unless those conditions could be
complied with. I cannot admit that in a case of such immense importance
one government has a right to break the engagements made by another,
without the least previous explanation with the Cortes, or even with the
individual whom they principally concern.
Sir. are fully aware of the consequences of leaving this matter
[graphic]Jitlt, 1813. COMMAND OP THE SPANISH AKMY. 101
unexplained; and I must beg to call to your recollection that in the
last conversation which passed between us, you informed me that Lord
Wellington would be told that the Regency were concerned that any thing
had happened which could give him offence, but that it was
unintentional; that the recall of General Castanos was indispensable,
but that all the motives for it could not be disclosed until his arrival
at Cadiz; that General Giron would be left in his command; that the
motives for the appointment of General Lacy would be or had been
explained to him, and that General Freyre had been sent to him under a
conviction that he would approve his appointment. Not one word of all
this is contained in your letter. You will recollect that I asked you if
there were any objection to my seeing the letter previously to its being
sent to Lord Wellington. You replied that it was not consistent with the
rules of office to show it to me, but that you pledged your honour for
its being conformable to the tenor of our conversation.
It is possible that the letter of which you have had the goodness to
transmit me a copy is accompanied by another which contains the required
explanation. If not, I must express my apprehension that the next
courier will bring Lord Wellington’s resignation. It is not, however,
too late to prevent this by a few lines of explanation, which I will
undertake to send by a courier if you will write them.
I cannot doubt the sincerity of your desire that Lord Wellington should
continue in the command of the Spanish army. You passed four months at
his head-quarters, during which period you had an opportunity of
appreciating the advantages which the cause would derive from his
holding the command. You have repeatedly stated them to me and to others
of your friends; and it was a matter of singular satisfaction to me that
an officer of your experience and talents, who had been upon Lord
Wellington’s Staff, and who would be fully disposed to co-operate in his
exertions for the improvement of the army, was placed at the head of the
War Department.
I have no doubt. Sir, that the Regency is sensible of the immense
responsibility which rests upon His Highness if Lord Wellington should
resign the command. It is not so much the consequences with which this
event will be attended in Spain, as the effect which it will produce in
England and in the North, of which I am apprehensive. What will be the
feelings of our Allies in the North if, after a campaign unexampled I
believe in the military annals of any nation, the success of which
depended principally upon the combined movement of the whole force of
the Peninsula, and consequently upon its being directed by one head, the
chief who conducted it should be compelled to relinquish the command of
the army of that power principally concerned in the success of the
contest? The natural inference must be that there is not that cordiality
between the Allies in the Peninsula which is necessary to ensure the
object for which the contest was undertaken. Such an inference could not
fail to produce the most dangerous effects upon the councils of our
Allies in the North, and if they should be undetermined as to the
prosecution of the war, might very likely tend to hasten the conclusion
of a peace, which would leave us once more to contend with the whole
power of France.
This is no exaggerated view of the consequences of Lord Wellington’s
resignation at the present moment. It is for those upon whom the
responsibility rests to determine whether it will be worth while to try
to prevent it in the manner I have pointed out.
I am, Sir, &c,
H. Wellesley. VOL. VIII. M
n.
The Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley to Don Juan O’Donqju. Sib, Cadiz,
29th July, 1813.
In conseqnence of the communication which yon made to me this morning, I
think it necessary to state to you that the letter which I addressed to
the Minister of War yesterday was a private letter. You saw the draft of
it, which was marked “private.” The cover of the copy addressed to the
Minister of War had “reservada” written upon it, which I conceive to
mean private.
I think this explanation necessary, because it seems to be imputed to me
that I am so ignorant or so regardless of diplomatic forms as to address
the Minister of War officially.
A perusal of the letter will sufficiently explain the motives with which
it was written, viz., an anxious desire to prevent a circumstance which
I cannot but consider as highly injurious to the cause of the Allies.
I am, with great regard, &c. 4c,
II. Wt.ii F.si Er.
The Right Hon. Sir Henry WeUetley to Field Marshal the Marquess of
Wellington.
My Dear ABTHUB, Cadiz, 16th Aug., 1813.
I have received your letters of the 4th and 6th. Tour battles in the
Pyrenees seem to have surpassed all the other events of this
extraordinary campaign. I wish I could say that they had made the
impression which they ought to have made upon this government, but they
have been almost passed over in silence, to the indignation of all the
well meaning people in this place.
I enclose a copy of the note which I addressed to the government in
consequence of the instructions which I received from Lord Castlereagh.
You will see that I have avoided all mention of General Castafios, and
have only remonstrated upon the breach of conditions with you. Lord
Castlereagh’s despatch and private letter left me no choice as to making
a remonstrance, and indeed I am not surprised that the British
government should take this matter up as likely to be of serious injury
to the cause of the Allies. In that view of it the British government
had a perfect right to interfere. In his private letter to me Lord
Castlereagh says, “I have thought it advisable to lose no time in
authorizing you to take up the late most perverse encroachment upon Lord
Wellington’s authority with decision. I have been desirous of making
this interposition the exclusive act of the government, and you may show
my despatch with its enclosure to the Minister for Foreign Affairs,
which will satisfy him that the displeasure occasioned by the conduct of
the Spanish government has neither been excited by you nor Lord
Wellington. I consider the present point as one on which the authority
of the British government may be advantageously pressed, not merely with
a view of arresting a great evil, but of chesking the Anti-Anglican
party in the government and Cortes.”
I took upon myself, however, to alter the note, knowing the mischief
which would have been produced by the mention of the removal of General
Castafios, which in fact is not, as I have all along insisted, the cause
of the difference between you and the Spanish government. But agreeing
as I do entirely with Lord Castlereagh, that the British government has
decidedly a right to interfere in a case involving the success of the
war, I did not hesitate to send the note, of which the enclosed is a
copy.
No answer has as yet been returned to it. I was anxious to get the
answer before I wrote to you, but I will not any longer delay informing
you of what has passed. I understand that the Minister of War is
furious, and complains of the interference of the British government;
but I think I can prove, beyond the power of contradiction, that we have
a decided right to interfere.
I gave an extract of your letter of the 4th to the Minister of State,
with a request that he would communicate it to the Regency, and that he
would particularly call their attention to that part of it which relates
to tha feeding of the army. Everybody complains of the manner in which
the business is conducted in the War Department; everything is in
arrear. Indeed the Minister of War has such rotten health that I do not
think it ]>ossible he can continue long in office.
Ever, my dear Arthur, most affectionately yonrs,
H. Wf.llesi.ey.
To General Castaflos.
‘ Mon Cher General, ‘ Lcsaca, ce 3 Sept., 1813.
‘ J’ai recu votre lettre de Bilbao du 24 Aout, pour laquelle je vous
suis bien oblige.
‘ Je vous conseille de ne pas aller par Madrid si vous le pouvez. II
pourrait y avoir quelqif expression populaire qui vous fcrait du mal
dans ces temps-ci.
‘ Vous aurez appris avec plaisir la conduite ct les succes de votre
ancienne armt’c de la Galice. Jc l’ai fait battre Soult toute seule. Les
Anglais n’ont pas tire un seul coup de ce cote-la. La prise de San
Sebastian est une bonne affaire. ‘ Agreez, &c.
‘ El General Castanos.’ ‘ Wellington.
To the Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley, K.B.
‘ My Dear Henry, ‘ Lesaca, 3rd Sept., 1813.
‘ I received last week your letters of the 16th and 20th, and the
dispatches that will go to Cadiz by this occasion will show you what we
have been doing since. I should think that the Spaniards will be better
pleased with the battle of San Marcial than with any event of the
campaign. Their troops certainly behaved remarkably well. They were a
little desirous of being relieved towards the end of the day; but I saw
that the enemy were done, and I would not relieve them.
‘ I think you have managed your note about the engagement to me
admirably. Nobody can, with justice, complain of it, and an ally has a
right to interfere in the way you have interfered for the British
Government. What I dreaded was the communication of the order to me not
to allow the order of the Spanish Government for the removal of Castanos
to be put in execution. That would have been foreign interference with a
vengeance, in a concern purely domestic.
• I enclose you the letter which the Minister of War wrote to me, and my
answer, in which you will see that I have brought matters to a crisis,
and they now must decide to take me upon the terms stated, or to leave
me, and to have this letter circulated, together with all the
correspondence, throughout Europe. They appear to me to be going on
terribly; and the whole of Spain is disgusted with them.
‘ I enclose the copy of a letter which I have received from Admiral T.
B. Martin at Plymouth, from which you will see that the armistice is
broken off, and that Austria takes part with the allies in the war. I do
not know the particulars, as the main facts, viz., the renewal of
hostilities, and the part taken by Austria, were communicated to
Plymouth by telegraph. By late accounts, however, from the Continent, it
appeared that the negotiations at Prague were a mere farce. Caulincourt
never proceeded upon his full powers; and Metternich declared, that if
preliminaries of peace were not signed on the 10th, Austria would
declare war on the 11th. You may state these facts to the Spanish
Government as authentic.
‘ Ever yours most affectionately, ■ The Right Hon. ‘ Wellington.
SirH. Wellesley.K.B.
‘ Your boy Gerald has been ill, but he is better; but I suppose Lady W.
writes to you about him. I will settle the business for Mrs. Strange as
she wishes.
‘ Pray return the enclosed papers, as I have no copy of them.’
To General Castanets. ‘ Mon Cher General, ‘ i Lesaca, co 13 Sept., 1813.
‘ J’ai reçu hier au soir votre lettre du 8, et j’envoie celle-ci a
Alava, croyant possible que vous la trouviez a Vitoria.
‘ Vous faites bien de continuer votre route vers Cadiz, sans donner
motif a la jalousie, s’il est possible. Et pour cela, il faudrait eviter
toutes les occasions qui pourraient se presenter,dans lesquelles les
sentimens du pcuple pourraient eclater. En arrivant en Andalousie dans
les premiers jours du mois d’Octobre, vous serez dans le cas de juger de
quelle maniere les affaires vont tourner.
‘ Agreez, &c.
‘ El General Castanos. ‘ ‘ Wellington.
To Sir R. Kennedy, Commissary General. • Slr, ‘Vera, 16th October, 1813.
‘ I beg you to give directions that provision may be made for the
conveyance of the tents and necessary baggage of two battalions of Lord
Aylmer’s brigade, and for their supply while engaged in an operation
near Santoiia.
‘ His Lordship will probably disembark at Castro Urdiales ; and this
provision should be made there.
‘ The bat and baggage mules belonging to the brigade, and the
Commissariat now attached to them, are to remain at Renteria till they
retire.
‘ I have the honor to be, &c. ‘ Sir R. Kennedy.’ ‘ Wellington.
To Captain Sir George Collier, R.N. ‘ Sir, ‘ Vera, 16th October, 1813.
‘ I have the honor to inform you, that I have directed Major General
Lord Aylmer to proceed with two battalions of the troops under his
command and 40 artillerymen, in concert with you, to close in and render
more secure the blockade of Santona.
‘ The troops will be in readiness to embark whenever you will acquaint
Lord Aylmer that the ships are ready to receive them.
‘ It is desirable that some provision should be made for conveying some
horses for his Lordship, the Field Officers, and Staff.
‘ I have the honor to be, &c. ‘ Captain Sir G. Collier, R.N’ *
Wellington.
To the Right Hon. Sir Henry Welletley, K.B.
‘ My Dear Henry, ‘ Vera, 16th October, 1813.
* I received this morning your letter of the 5th.
‘ I have read in the Conciso Colonel Smith’s statement respecting San
Sebastian, which appears to me sufficiently correct, excepting that he
has not stated that the town was on fire before the assault began; and
he has stated that the enemy threw shells into the town from the castle,
after the former was in our possession. The last is not true, I believe.
‘ There is no end of the calumnies against me and the army, and I should
have no time to do any thing else, if I were to begin either to refute
or even to notice them. Very lately they took the occasion of a libel in
an Irish newspaper, reporting a supposed conversation between Castanos
and me, (in which 1 am supposed to have consented to change my religion
to become King of Spain, and he to have promised the consent of the
Grandees,) to accuse me
of this intention; and then those fools the Duques de
and de * * •, and the Viscomte de , protest formally
that they are not of the number of the Grandees who had given their
consent to such an arrangement!!! What can be done with such libels and
such people, excepting despise them, and continuing one’s road without
noticing them ?
‘ I should have taken no notice of the libel about San Sebastian, if it
had not come officially before me in the letter from the Minister at
War; nor shall I of this second libel in the Duende, although, from what
I sec of it in the Redactor,for I do not take the Duende, it is obvious
that it comes from the Minister at War; and is written in expectation
that my answer to his letter would be, that there had been no plunder,
and no punishment.
‘ From what I hear from Alava, I fear that we have not yet heard the end
of this business. He says he has seen a letter from an officer who was
in the storm, to another at Vitoria, which was handed about that town,
boasting of the outrages committed there in revenge, as the officer
says, for the inhabitants having fired upon our troops in the first
storm. I believe there were no troops (that did not get in and were made
prisoners) near enough to be fired upon by the inhabitants in the first
storm. However, if such a letter has been written, it shows that I have
been mistaken, and that the officers did not obey my orders or do their
duty as I imagined when 1 wrote to you on the 9th. 1 am now inquiring
about the writer of that letter ; and if I should discover him, I shall
certainly inquire into the circumstances.
* It is quite clear to me that if we do not beat down the democracy at
Cadiz, the cause is lost: how that is to be done, God knows!
‘ I see by the French newspapers that Buonaparte was still at Dresden on
the 28th of last month. The communication with France had been
interrupted, but was re-established. Nothing had occurred of importance.
‘ Ever yours most affectionately,
• The Right Hon. ‘ Wellington.
To General Castanos. ‘ Mon Cher Général, ‘ à St Jean de Luz, ce 27 Nov,
1813.
* Je vous envoie une lettre du Commissaire Général sur un pillage de
biscuit par l’armée de la Galice dans la retraite de Salamanque au mois
de Novembre de l’année dernière ; dont je vous serai bien obligé de me
faire dire si vous savez quelque chose.
‘ Si les troupes prirent le biscuit, comme le disent les charretiers, ce
sera un à compte entre les deux Gouvernemens, et il serait dur de le
faire payer aux charretiers sur le loyer de leurs charrettes. Si les
troupes de Galice ne prirent pas le biscuit, ou s’il n’y a pas quelque
preuve là-dessus, il faut que je fasse payer le prix du biscuit aux
charretiers.
* Il y a bien long-temps que je ne vous ai écrit, mais vous aurez vu les
nouvelles dans les journaux ; et pour des réflexions sur les événemens
du jour, il y en a tant à faire que je n’ai pas le temps de les écrire,
ni vous le loisir de les lire. D’ailleurs vous savez les faire aussi
bien que moi.
‘ Agréez, &c.
‘ El General Castanos.’ ‘ Wellington.
To General Don X. CastaHos.
‘ Mon Cher Général, ‘ à St. Jean de Luz, ce 13 Déc., 1813.
‘ Je reçois votre lettre du 9, et je réponds à celle du Marques de
Salucci, et je vous envoie la réponse qu’il vous montrera. Je n’ai pas
le temps de vous écrire beaucoup. Alava vous apprendra les nouvelles.
Vous serez bien aise de savoir que le Général Hill battit l’ennemi
terriblement avant hier. Il y a long-temps que je n’ai pas vu tant de
morts sur le champ de bataille.
‘ J’ai ma droite sur l’Adour, de laquelle la communication est coupée
pour l’ennemi.
‘ Agréez, &c.
‘ El General Castanos. ‘ ‘ Wellington.
Sir John Hope, K.B. ‘ •
To His Excellency the Minister at War, Cadiz. • Sir, ‘ Lesaca, 9th October, 1813
‘ I have received your letter of the ’28th September, enclosing one from the Xefe Politico of Guipuzcoa, containing a complaint of the conduct of the allied British and Portuguese army under my command, in the assault of San Sebastian ; and, as this is a subject upon which I am directed to correspond exclusively with His Majesty’s Minister, I have written my answer to the Ambassador at Cadiz, to whom I beg leave to refer you.
• I have the honor to be, &c.
‘ The Minister at War.’ ‘ Wellington.
To the Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley, K.B.
‘ Sir, ‘ Lesaca, 9th October, 1813.
‘ I enclose a letter which I have received from the Minister at War, of the 28th September, in which he has enclosed the copy of one of the 5th September from the Conde de Villa Fuentes, the Xefe Politico of the province of Guipuzcoa, complaining of the conduct of the allied British and Portuguese army in the storm of the town of San Sebastian; and, as I received at the same time the enclosed newspaper*, which contains the same charges against that army in a more amplified style, and both appear to proceed from the same authority, I shall proceed to reply to both complaints ; and I trouble your Excellency on this subject, as it is one upon which your Excellency will recollect that I have orders to correspond with His Majesty’s Minister alone.
‘ I should have wished to adopt another mode of justifying the officers concerned on this occasion; but as there is no redress by the law for a libel, I must be satisfied with that which is in my hands.
‘ I shall begin with that charge which the enclosed newspaper contains, and which is not made in direct terms in the letter from the Xefe Politico, though it is directly charged against Lieut. General Sir Thomas Graham that he intended to burn the town; viz., that the town of San Sebastian was thus ill treated, because its former trade had been exclusively with the French nation, and to the disadvantage of Great Britain.
‘ This charge cannot be intended to apply to the common soldiers, who cannot be supposed to know or to reflect much upon what passed before they attacked the place. This infamous charge applies exclusively to the principal officers,
* The Ductule. Published also in the ‘ Memoires pour servir a l’Histoire de la Revolution d’Espagne, par Nellerto’ (Uorente),which is referred to by the Abbe de iiontgaillard in his ‘ Histoire de Fiance,’, asauthority on this subject.
who, from motives, not of commercial policy, but of commercial revenge, are supposed so far to have forgotten their duty as to have ordered or suffered the sack of this unfortunate town, and thus to have risked the loss of all they had acquired by their labors and their gallantry; and you will more readily conceive, than I can venture to describe, the feelings of indignation with which I proceed to justify the General and other officers of this army from a charge officially made by a person in a high office, that they designed to plunder and burn the town of San Sebastian.
‘ I need not assure you that this charge is most positively untrue. Every thing was done that was in my power to suggest to save the town. Several persons urged me, in the strongest manner, to allow it to be bombarded, as the most certain mode of forcing the enemy to give it up. This I positively would not allow, for the same reasons as I did not allow Ciudad Rodrigo or Badajoz to be bombarded; and yet if I had harbored so infamous a wish as to destroy this town from motives of commercial revenge, or any other, I could not have adopted a more certain method than to allow it to be bombarded.
‘ Neither is it true that the town was set on fire by the English and Portuguese troops. To set fire to the town was part of the enemy’s defence. It was set on fire by the enemy on the 22nd of July, before the final attempt was made to take it by storm; and it is a fact that the fire was so violent on the 24th of July, that the storm, which was to have taken place on that day, was necessarily deferred till the 25th, and, as it is well known, failed.
‘ I was at the siege of San Sebastian on the 30th of August, and I aver that the town was then on fire. It must have been set on fire by the enemy, as I repeat that our batteries, by positive order, threw no shells into the town; and I saw the town on fire on the morning of the 31st of August, before the storm took place.
* It is well known that the enemy had prepared for a serious resistance, not only on the ramparts, but in the streets of the town; that traverses were established in the streets, formed of combustibles, with the intention of setting fire to and exploding them during the contest with the assailants. It is equally known that there was a most severe contest in the streets of the town between the assailants and the garrison; that many of these traverses were exploded, by which many lives on both sides were lost; and it is a fact that these explosions set fire to many of the houses.
‘ The Xefe Politico, the author of these complaints, must have been as well aware of these facts as I am, and he ought not to have concealed them. In truth, the fire in the town was the greatest evil that could befall the assailants, who did every thing in their power to get the better of it; and it is a fact that, owing to the difficulty and danger of communicating through the fire with the advanced posts in the town, it had very nearly become necessary at one time to withdraw those posts entirely.
‘ In regard to the plunder of the town by the soldiers, I am the last man who will deny it, because I know that it is true. It has fallen to my lot to take many towns by storm ; and I am concerned to add that I never saw or heard of one so taken, by any troops, that it was not plundered. It is one of the evil consequences attending the necessity of storming a town, which every officer laments, not only on account of the evil thereby inflicted on the unfortunate inhabitants, but on account of the injury it does to discipline, and the risk which is incurred of the loss of all the advantages of victory, at the very moment they are gained.
* It is hard that I and my General Officers are to be so treated as we have been by the Xefe Politico, and unrestrained libellers, because an unavoidable evil has occurred in the accomplishment of a great service, and in the acquirement of a great advantage. The fault does not lie with us; it is with those who lost the fort, and obliged us at great risk and loss to regain it for the Spanish nation by storm.
• Notwithstanding that I am convinced it is impossible to prevent a town in such a situation from being plundered, I can prove that upon this occasion particular pains were taken to prevent it. I gave most positive orders upon the subject, and desired that the officers might be warned of the peculiar situation of the place, the garrison having the castle to retire to, and of the danger that they would attempt to retake the town if they found the assailants were engaged in plunder.
‘ If it had not been for the fire, which certainly augmented the confusion, and afforded greater facilities for irregularity; and if by far the greatest proportion of the officers and noncommissioned officers, particularly of the principal officers who stormed the breach, had not been killed or wounded in the performance of their duty in the service of Spain, to the number of 170 out of about 250, I believe that the plunder would have been in a great measure, though not entirely, prevented.
‘ Indeed, one of the subjects of complaint, that sentries were placed on every house, shows the desire at least of the officers to preserve order.. These sentries must have been placed by order; and unless it is supposed, as charged, that the officers intended that the town should be plundered and burned, and placed the sentries to secure that object, it must be admitted that their intention in placing these sentries was good.
• It likewise most unfortunately happened that it was impossible to relieve the troops which stormed the town till the 2nd instant, instead of immediately after the town was in our possession. Those who make these complaints forget that on the 31st of August, the day this town was stormed, the whole of the left of the army was attacked by the enemy.
‘ I do not believe that I should have been congratulated and thanked for having successfully done my duty on that occasion, if I had either risked the blockade of Pamplona, or the loss of the battle fought on the 31st of August, by keeping at San Sebastian troops to relieve those which had stormed, in order that the inhabitants of San Sebastian might suffer rather less by their irregularities. In fact, it it was not possible to allot troops to relieve them till the 2nd; at which time I assert that all irregularity had ceased, as I was at San Sebastian on that day.
‘ In regard to the injuries done to the inhabitants by the soldiers with their fire arms and bayonets, in return for their applause and congratulations, it appears to me extraordinary that it did not occur to the complainants that these injuries, if they were really done, were done by accident, during the contest in the streets with the enemy, and not by design.
‘ In regard to the charge of kindness to the enemy, I am afraid it is but too well founded; and that till it is positively ordered by authority, in return for the Ordonnance of the French Government, adverted to in my dispatch of the 10th September*, that all enemy’s troops in a place taken by storm shall be put to death, it will be difficult to prevail upon British officers and soldiers to treat an enemy, when their prisoners, otherwise than well.
‘ I wish that the Xefe Politico had not made the charge against so respectable a character as Lieut. General Sir Thomas Graham, that he omitted to apply for his assistance to extinguish the fire in the town till it was entirely destroyed, leaving the inference to be drawn that he therefore wished that the town should be destroyed, as it would have saved me the pain of observing, that the total neglect of the Spanish authorities to furnish any assistance whatever that was required from them to carry on the operations against San Sebastian did not encourage Sir Thomas to apply for the assistance of the Xefe Politico in any shape. In fact, every thing was done that could be done to extinguish the fire by our own soldiers; and I believe that the truth is, that the assistance was asked by me, not only to endeavor to extinguish the fire, but to bury the dead bodies lying about the town and ramparts ; and it was not made sooner, because the want of it was not felt at an earlier period.
‘ I certainly lament as much as any man can the evils sustained by this unfortunate town, and those who have reason to complain of their fate, and deserve the relief of Government; but a person in the situation of a Xefe Politico should take care, in forwarding these complaints, not to attack the characters of honorable and brave men, who are as incapable of entertaining a design to injure the peaceable inhabitants of any town, as they are of allowing their conduct to be influenced by the infamous motives attributed to them in the enclosed libel.
‘ I hear frequently of the union of the two nations; but I am quite certain that nothing is so little likely to promote that union as the encouragement given to such unfounded charges, and the allowing such infamous libels to pass unpunished.
‘ I have only to add, to what I have already stated in this letter, in answer to the Minister at War’s inquiries regarding the punishment of the offenders on this occasion, that * See page 103.
several soldiers were punished. How many, it is not in my power at present to state.
‘ I have the honor to be, &c. • The Right Hon. ‘Wellington.
Sir John Hope, K.B. ‘•
To the Gonde de Villa Fuentes, Xefe Politico. > Sir, ‘ Vera, 10th October, 1813.
‘ I have had the honor of receiving a letter from you, dated the 27th of September, in regard to the peage for the repair of the roads.
* I beg your Excellency to address yourself upon all subjects relating to the British and Portuguese army to Don Miguel Alava, through whom I communicate with any Spanish authority on any subject relating to that army; and if your Excellency has occasion to write to me on any subject relating to the Spanish army, I beg you to address yourself to the Captain General of the province.
‘ These are the channels through which I am directed to communicate with the civil authorities of the country, and I am anxious to obey the directions which I have received.
‘ I have the honor to be, &c. ‘ El Conde de Villa Fuentes.’ ‘ WELLINGTON.
To the Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley, K.B. • My Dear Henry, ‘ Vera, 1 Ith October, 1813.
‘ I enclose my dispatch of the last affairs here. I have thought it better to write to you than to the Minister at War, regarding the plunder of San Sebastian, as it is one which regards exclusively the British and Portuguese troops, on which Ministers have no business to correspond with me.
‘ I never saw such a libel as in the Duende. If it is published ia England, I shall prosecute the printer. I conclude that by this time I am no longer in command of the army.
* I think it would do no harm, if you were to hint occasionally to some of our friends at Cadiz that all this will tend to put people in England very much out of humor with the Spanish alliance; and that if the people should once become disgusted with it, they will not find the Government, or any of the leading men, very warm.
‘ I do not know how long my temper will last; but I was never so much disgusted with any thing as with this libel; and I do not know whether the conduct of the soldiers in plundering San Sebastian, or the libels of the Xefe Politico and Duende, made me most angry.
‘ Ever yours most affectionately, • The Right Hon. ‘ Wellington.
To the Right Hon. Sir Henry Welletley, K.B.
‘ My Dear Henry, ‘ Vera, 16th October, 1813.
* I received this morning your letter of the 5th.
‘ I have read in the Conciso Colonel Smith’s statement respecting San Sebastian, which appears to me sufficiently correct, excepting that he has not stated that the town was on fire before the assault began; and he has stated that the enemy threw shells into the town from the castle, after the former was in our possession. The last is not true, I believe.
‘ There is no end of the calumnies against me and the army, and I should have no time to do any thing else, if I were to begin either to refute or even to notice them. Very lately they took the occasion of a libel in an Irish newspaper, reporting a supposed conversation between Castanos and me, (in which 1 am supposed to have consented to change my religion to become King of Spain, and he to have promised the consent of the Grandees,) to accuse me
of this intention; and then those fools the Duques de
and de * * •, and the Viscomte de , protest formally
that they are not of the number of the Grandees who had given their consent to such an arrangement!!! What can be done with such libels and such people, excepting despise them, and continuing one’s road without noticing them ?
‘ I should have taken no notice of the libel about San Sebastian, if it had not come officially before me in the letter from the Minister at War; nor shall I of this second libel in the Duende, although, from what I sec of it in the Redactor, for I do not take the Duende, it is obvious that it comes from the Minister at War; and is written in expectation that my answer to his letter would be, that there had been no plunder, and no punishment.
‘ From what I hear from Alava, I fear that we have not yet heard the end of this business. He says he has seen a letter from an officer who was in the storm, to another at Vitoria, which was handed about that town, boasting of the outrages committed there in revenge, as the officer says, for the inhabitants having fired upon our troops in the first storm. I believe there were no troops (that did not get in and were made prisoners) near enough to be fired upon by the inhabitants in the first storm. However, if such a letter has been written, it shows that I have been mistaken, and that the officers did not obey my orders or do their duty as I imagined when 1 wrote to you on the 9th. 1 am now inquiring about the writer of that letter ; and if I should discover him, I shall certainly inquire into the circumstances.
* It is quite clear to me that if we do not beat down the democracy at Cadiz, the cause is lost: how that is to be done, God knows!
‘ I see by the French newspapers that Buonaparte was still at Dresden on the 28th of last month. The communication with France had been interrupted, but was re-established. Nothing had occurred of importance.
‘ Ever yours most affectionately,
• The Right Hon. ‘ Wellington.
Sir H. Wellenley, K.B.
‘ About the removal of the Government to Madrid, I acknowledge that I am not quite satisfied that it is right and safe. You see how affairs stand in Catalonia and Valencia, and how little has been done on that side of the Peninsula. If Soult could collect a sufficient force to keep me in check on this side, there is nothing to prevent Suchet from resuming his position in Valencia, where, and in Catalonia, excepting that he himself destroyed Tarragona, he would find every thing in the state in which he left it. If this were to happen, the first step he would take would be to detach a few cavalry towards Cuenca. The Government and Cortes being at Madrid would be a temptation to do so; and if he did, the confusion, inconvenience, and distress would be extreme, and the loss of reputation to the Government infinite.
* I have said nothing upon this subject to any body. It is not my business, and nobody has asked me the question ; and I thought it desirable to- get the Government out of Cadiz at all events. I think, however, for the present, they ought to stop at Cordova. This place is well advanced towards Madrid, and several great communications branch off from it. The Guadalquivir is navigable to Cordova, and the first removal will not be difficult. It is a place not so much under the influence of the priesthood as Seville ; it is more in the way than Granada; and equally capable with both of accommodating the Government and Cortes.
‘ You may make what use you please of these opinions of mine ; or no use if you do not choose it.’
To Captain Sir George Collier, R.N.
‘ S1R, ‘ Vera, 23rd October, 1813.
‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 21st of October. The subject to which that letter, and mine of the 20th relate, is one of great importance, as well to the convenience of the army, as to the revenues of Spain, which it is a great object to Great Britain to improve; and as it appeared you had spoken officially to the person charged with the collection of the Spanish revenues at Pasages, I conceived that you might have received orders on the subject ; and as I had received none, but had commenced a correspondence upon it with the Spanish officer, with whom I correspond on these subjects, I wished to know precisely what had passed, in order that I might regulate my conduct accordingly.
* I have now the honor to enclose the copy of the letter which I have addressed to General Alava, on the subject of the exemption from the revenue laws of Spain of the vessels attending the army; from which you will be made acquainted with the principles on which 1 have viewed this question.
‘ I am determined that, if I can prevent it, no illicit commerce shall be carried on by masters of transports or others, under pretence that they are conveying cargoes for the service of the army; and if you should concur in this principle, you will judge whether you ought to give any master of a transport, or of any other merchantman, such a certificate as that which you mention in your letter.
‘ If you should not concur in this principle, I will address the Secretary of State on the subject, in order that the wishes and intentions of His Majesty’s Government may be clearly understood.
‘ I certainly have it in my power to arrange the matter in the way I wish, by which every convenience and advantage would be acquired for the army, without reference to Government ; but in all these cases in which there is an apparent difference of opinion between authorities of the same nation, independent of each other, in which the interests of another nation and of individuals are concerned, it is best to have the orders of Government. I beg to know, therefore, whether you coneur with mc in the principles laid down in the enclosed letter; that the indulgence of exemption from the revenue laws of Spain should be claimed only for those articles, of which the officers of the Commissary General shall produce the invoice.
‘ I have the honor to be, &c. ‘ Captain Sir G. Collier, R. N: ‘ Wellington.
To the Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley, K.B.
‘ Si R, * Vera, 23rd October, 1813.
•When I wrote to you last, in regard to the complaints made to the Spanish Government of the conduct of the officers of the British army, in the storm of San Sebastian, I had directed that Major General Hay, who commanded in the town after the storm, should be called upon to account for his conduct; and having afterwards heard that an officer of the 5th division had written to a friend in Vitoria, exulting over the misfortunes which the town had suffered, I directed that particular inquiry might be made respecting the writer of this supposed letter.
‘ I have now the honor to enclose Major General Hay’s answer, with its several enclosures, being letters from the officers in the temporary command of brigades, the General officers who commanded them having been wounded, and from the officers commanding regiments, from which you will see the total want of foundation for the charge, that the mischief, which the town has sustained, was done by the allied troops. In fact, the officers and troops did every thing in their power to stop the progress of the fire, which was set to the town by the enemy ; and many lost their lives in the attempt, owing to the fire of musketry kept up upon the roofs of the houses, by the enemy in the castle.
‘ In the course of the inquiry upon this subject, a fact has come out, which I acknowlege that I had not heard of before, and as little suspected; but it is sufficiently the cause of the groundless complaints upon this subject, of the aggravation with which they have been brought before the public, and of the channel in which they have been conveyed to the public notice; viz., that the inhabitants of the town of San Sebastian co-operated with the enemy in the defence of the town, and actually fired upon the allies. This appears, not only from the statement of the officers, but is fully corroborated by that of the Chevalier de Songeon, and the officers of the French garrison, who signed the enclosed certificate of his conduct.
‘ It is not astonishing that the inhabitants, from whom the town was taken for the nation, should complain of those who took it from them.
• The enclosed papers, and my former letter, will fully prove, that, whatever may have been the conduct of the inhabitants of the town, the destruction of it was not to be attributed to the officers and soldiers of the allied army; although it is certain that the soldiers, like other soldiers who storm a town, did plunder it.
‘ When I last addressed you on this subject, I was not enabled to answer precisely, whether any, and what men had been punished for plundering, because, what will always appear extraordinary, I had no knowledge whatever of the existence of the complaints of the officers and troops till I received the letter of the Minister at War, of the 28th of September, notwithstanding that I was stationed only five leagues from the place, and was in San Sebastian four times between the 1st and the 8th of September.
‘ I now enclose the report of one of the Assistant Provost Marshals, sent into the town to preserve order, which, besides Major General Hay’s report, will show that punishment was not neglected.
‘ I have the honor to be, &c.
‘ The Right Hon. ‘ Wellington.
Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.
‘ P. S. I have omitted to mention that, in his report to the French Government on the assault of San Sebastian, General Rey states, that when the assault commenced, the town was on fire in six different places. I believe that, after this, and knowing that several houses took fire from the explosion during the contest in the town, it will be admitted that it was not burnt by the British soldiers.’
To the Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley, K.B. ‘ My DEAR Henry, ‘ Vera, 23rd October, 1813.
* I received yesterday your letter of the 14th inst. The Cortes have acted in respect to the resignation as they have on every other subject.
* The delay is a matter of indifference to me; and things may go on as they are as long as they choose to delay. In the mean time, the Minister at War has written me a most impertinent letter, of which I shall take no notice.
‘ I fancy they begin to be a little alarmed at Cadiz, about the effect in England of all that they are doing; and I sec from the papers that they want to make a treaty with us. It is my opinion that we ought to have no communication with such people that is not absolutely necessary for the purposes of the war. We ought to keep them at arm’s length, and to take every opportunity of marking our dislike to their infamous system of rule.
‘ I would recommend to you, if you find the new Cortes act upon the same democratical system as the last, to quit them, and travel about, and amuse yourself. You might go to my place near Granada, Seville, or even Madrid; and leave one of your secretaries to do the business, referring every thing for your opinion. The country would soon discover the meaning of our coldness towards them; and some part or other would declare themselves in a manner to enable us to declare openly likewise.
‘ I do not know whether I have a house at Soto de Roma, but if I have, and it is habitable, and Lord Hinchinbroke chooses to go there, I hope he will make use of it. OXalor is going there on account of his health, and will settle all my affairs there. I am told that the place is beautiful; and the climate delightful. Pray present my best compliments to Lord and Lady Hinchinbroke, and believe me
‘ Ever yours most affectionately, ‘ The Right Hon. ‘Wellington.
Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.
‘ I do not know whether I am right, but it strikes me that the climate of Cadiz is particularly unfavorable to persons with disorders on the lungs. If this is the case, Lord Hinchinbroke should leave it.’
To the Right Hon. Henry WelUiley, K.D.
‘ My Dear Henry, ‘ Vera, 20th October, 1813.
‘I think it worth while to send you the copy of the letter of the 25th ultimo, which I have received from the Minister at War, to which I adverted in my last.
‘ Some time ago, General San Juan sent a complaint here of the wants of the cavalry, &c., in Andalusia, which I forwarded to the Government; in answer to which, I received from the Minister at War a letter dated the 8th of September, in which he told me, that upon the complaints of General San Juan, he had dictated ” providencias oportnnas, executivas, y energicas.” In reply, I wrote on the 17th of September a letter to the Minister at War, of which I enclose a copy, in which I begged to know what those orders were, in order that I might take care they were obeyed, which letter was in fact drawn and written in the office of the Chief of the Staff, and signed by me; and is in the common official form. The answer on the 5th of October tells me, in the most impertinent terms, that I shall not know what these orders are.
‘ It is not worth while to embarrass the discussion now going on with a complaint of the tenor and tone of this letter, as the decision, one way or other, will settle the matter; and if I am to hold the command, the Government will be under the necessity of at least communicating to me the orders which they send to the troops supposed to be under my command. I send you the letters, however, in order that, if we have any friends in the Cortes, you may communicate them to these friends privately, in order that they may sec how this gentleman treats me.
‘ Ever yours most affectionately, • The Right Hon. ‘ Wellington.
Sir H. milesley, K.B.
‘ You have not told me what progress you have made in getting money for the Spanish troops by the 1st of November.’
To the Right Hon. Sir Henry Welletley, K.B.
‘ My Dear Henry, ‘ Vera, 30th October, 1813.
‘ I have received your letter of the 19th. I never interfere in any concern of the Spanish Government; I have no correspondence with any authority, excepting through General Alava, on the concerns of the British and Portuguese, and through the Captains General on the concerns of the Spanish army; and I am entirely ignorant of every thing that passes. I think, however, that I am aware of the circumstances stated by General O’Donoju to the commission of the Cortes.
‘ Nearly about the time when the late Government were removed, I ordered the cavalry under General Freyre and San Juan, to march into Andalusia, in consequence of the reports of those generals of the miserable state in which the horses were, with the intention of giving them the advantage of the green forage in Andalusia, at an earlier period than they could get it elsewhere; and of equipping them with greater facility on the Guadalquivir, with the horse appointments and clothing expected at Cadiz from England, by means of the navigation of the river. The Government were duly made acquainted with these orders, and the motives for them; and General O’Donoju, the Inspector of the Cavalry, knew of the arrangement from the time I thought of it till the execution was completed.
‘ Some time afterwards when the Government was removed, I saw a paragraph in one of the newspapers, hinting that the march of the cavalry into Andalusia was connected with the designs of the late Government, which occasioned their removal; and I perfectly recollect, that on the day that General O’Donoju took leave of me on his departure for Cadiz, I observed to him that I had seen this hint, or charge, and I begged him, when he got to Cadiz, to take an early opportunity of explaining to the leading men in the Cortes, that it was I, and not the Government, who had moved the cavalry, and that he knew the motives for the movement were what I have above recited. I then pointed out the absurdity of suspecting me of any other motive than the ostensible one for this movement, or of
having any connexion with the supposed designs of the late Government; having been continually in a state of dispute with them, among other subjects, on part of the detail of the movement of this very cavalry, in which the Minister of War had interfered; and I told him that if I was suspected of such designs, they should remove me from the command, without a moment’s loss of time, as if I was not honest, I was an object of terror to every body.
‘ I remarked something very extraordinary in General O’Donoju’s manner upon this occasion, and in the attention with which he listened to me, and the length to which he brought the conversation, by the questions he asked mo on this subject; but all this made no impression upon me, till I heard from another quarter, that he had suspected me of evil designs in this movement of the cavalry, and that, although his suspicions were shaken in this conversation, he went away with the impression that I was either a perfectly honest man, or a very great rogue.
‘ I conclude that he has told this story to the commission of the Cortes. However, if Senor Mexia will take the trouble to examine the correspondence with the Minister at War on this subject, he will see that it is quite impossible that I could have had any other than the ostensible motive for the measure which was adopted. You may show Senor Mexia this part of the letter if you think proper.
‘ In regard to the libels in the Duende, I acknowledge that I cannot discover cither law or justice in what is called the Spanish law of libel, and I do not know how one is to proceed under it. What can be called a libel mischievous to the State, if it is not one, in a servant of the Government to call upon the people of Spain to take vengeance on our officers for the supposed sack of San Sebastian ?
‘ If the charge were true, it cannot be proper for a servant of the Government, proprietor of a newspaper, to call upon the people of Spain to revenge themselves, and one would suppose that such an act would be punished by the law. It appears, however, that it is deemed entirely innocent; and the Spaniards appear to be so warmly attached to the liberty, or rather licentiousness of the press, (of which they make so bad a use as that not one good work, or even pamphlet, has yet appeared on any subject,) that I should not think that any endeavor to persuade them to alter their law would have the smallest effect.
‘ I acknowledge that if such a paragraph as appeared in the Duende of the 4th instant, signed Mercedes, had been published, by an officer of the Government before I entered Spain in 1812, and the author had not been punished, or formally disavowed by the Government, I should never have entered Spain, and the siege of Cadiz would never have been raised, nor any of the other events occurred which have delivered Spain from the enemy.
‘ As we are now stationed, I wait till I know the conduct and decision of the Spanish Government, upon my dispatches to you of the 9th and 23rd, before I take any f urther steps; being determined that if they do not conduct themselves as I think they ought, and completely vindicate us, I shall make known my opinion to the King’s Government, that they ought not to risk their army here, under the circumstances of an officer of the Government having published such an atrocious libel, and then having called upon the people of Spain to take revenge of the acts falsely charged upon our officers; and the law giving no redress, and the Government keeping their officer in his office, and taking no notice, or inadequate notice, of his conduct.
‘ It will rest with the King’s Government to determine what they will do upon a consideration of all the circumstances of the case; but if I was to decide, I would not keep the army in Spain for one hour.
‘ Ever yours most affectionately, • The Right Hon. ‘ WELLINGTON.
Sir H. Wellesley, K.B. ‘
To the Magistrates of San Sebastian. • GENTLEMEN, ‘ Vera, 2nd Nov., 1813.
”I received only this day your letter of the 15th October, and I am very sorry that it is not in my power to be of any use to the town of San Sebastian.
* The course of the operations of the war rendered necessary the attack of that town, in order to expel the enemy from the Spanish territory; and it was a subject of the utmost concern to me to see that the enemy wantonly destroyed it.
‘ The infamous libels which have been circulated upon this subject, in which the destruction of the town has been attributed to the troops under my command, by order of their officers (notwithstanding that it was in great part burned, and was on fire in six places before they entered it by storm), render it a matter of delicacy for me to interfere in any manner in this affair; and I am very desirous not to be applied to again, and not again to have occasion to write upon it.
‘ I have the honor to be, &c. ‘ The Magistrates of ‘ WELLINGTON.
San Sebastian’
To the Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley, K.B. ‘ My Dear Henry, ‘ Vera, 2nd Nov., 1813.
‘ I have not got the Spanish law of libel, and I cannot tell whether it is possible to appeal from the decision of the Junta de Ccnsura.
• I think it advisable that you should have one of the best lawyers consulted on the subject, and see whether the Duende cannot be brought to punishment for that part of his paper of the 4th October, in which he calls upon the people of Spain to revenge themselves for the supposed acts at San Sebastian.
‘ If this has no other effect, it will tend to show the people in authority the grounds of our dissatisfaction, which are so reasonable, that, if there is any sense among them, they will attend to the subject. The only mode, however, of getting them to do any thing on any subject, is to frighten them ; and I recommend to you not to keep secret what I wrote in my last letter, which I shall certainly put in execution, be the consequences what they may.
‘ Ever yours most affectionately, • The Right Hon. ‘ Wellington.
To the Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley, K.B.
‘ Sir, ‘ ‘ Vera, 6th Nov., 1813.
‘ I have perused the statement published by the authority of the Government in the supplement of the Regency Gazette, of the 20th October, which I trust will have the effect of effacing the injurious impressions attempted to be made by the Xefe Politico of Guipuzcoa, and by the infamous libellers of Cadiz; and will frustrate the still more infamous attempts of the latter to excite the animosity of the people of this nation against the officers of the British army.
‘ 1 rather apprehend, however, that there is a mistake in the translation of one word in my letter, viz., the word jo/wnder; as that used to express it, viz., the word saquear, appears to me to convey a meaning that I did not intend to express. What I-meant to express was, that the soldiers had gone into the houses, and plundered them of wine principally, and of other articles, which, I believe, would be expressed by the word robar, or pillar, rather than by the word saquear. The soldiers did not sack the town; if I had said that, I should have said what was not true; viz., that they had destroyed the town, and committed other outrages besides the plunder of wine and other articles which they found in the houses.
‘ I request you to lay this letter before the Spanish Government, and to have this explanation published, as well as what has passed before.
‘ The Spanish Government are the best judges whether it would not be proper that they should take any other, and what measures, to satisfy the officers of the army on the subject of these infamous libels. That is a point upon which I am the last person who should give any opinion.
‘ I have the honor to be, &c. ‘ The Right Hon. ‘ Wellington.
To Lieut. General Sir Thomas Graham, K.B. ‘ My Dear Sir, ‘ St. Jean de Luz, 18th Nov., 1813.
‘ I have received your letter of the 9th. Before you left us, I had heard of the libel on the San Sebastian affair, and had written to my brother about it. I did not say any thing to you about it, because 1 did not wish to annoy you immediately on your departure, with a matter really not worth your attention.
‘ You will have since seen the libel in the Duende, which, however, I will enclose if I can find it; and I now enclose the letter which I wrote to my brother on the 9th instant upon that, and the letter from the Xe/e Politico of Guipuzcoa, from which the Duende is taken, of which I enclose the copy which was sent to me by the Minister at War. I then called upon General Hay for a report of what passed; and when I received it, I wrote a second letter on the 23rd of October, of which I enclose the copy.
‘ In the mean time, the libels on this subject multiplied throughout Spain. The Duende repeated his assertions, and went so far as to call upon the people of Spain to rise and revenge the injuries which the British soldiers had done to the people of San Sebastian. The Duende was prosecuted at the suit of the ambassador, before the Junta de Censura, and was acquitted !
‘ The Government, upon the receipt of my first letter to my brother, published the enclosed supplement to the Regency Gazette, in which you will observe, that they have translated the word plunder into saquear. This translation in some degree bore out the assertions of the Duende; and therefore I thought it best to write a third letter, of which I enclose the copy; in which I have explained what I meant by the word plunder, which I think ought to be construed by pillar or robar, and I have desired that this letter may likewise be published.
‘ If you choose to publish these letters in England, you have my full consent to do so. Probably that part, in the letter of October 23rd, which relates to the inhabitants of San Sebastian, might as well be omitted; but you will judge of this.
‘ You will have seen the account of an attack on the enemy’s position on the 10th. Soult had a very narrow escape. If I had had an hour or two more of daylight, or if I could have kept two divisions in reserve, I must have caught his right before they could have got into the entrenched camp at Bayonne.
‘ We have been remarkably well received by the French, indeed fully as well as in any part of Spain; and I am happy to add, that our troops and the Portuguese have behaved very well. The sentiments of the people in this part of the country respecting Buonaparte are exactly what one would suppose it to be under such a government as his. None, but the persons in office, and the higher class of the officers of the army, are attached to him. They tell us that the same sentiment prevails throughout France.
‘ Believe me, &c.
• Lieut. General ‘ Wellington.
Sir Thomas Graham, K.B.’
To Earl Bathurst.
‘ My DEAR Lord, ‘ St. Jean de Lur, 27th Nov., 1813.
‘ Matters are becoming so bad between us and the Spaniards, that I think it necessary to draw your attention seriously to the subject.
‘ You will have seen the libels about San Sebastian, which I know were written and published by an officer of the War Department, and I believe under the direction of the Minister at War, Don Juan O’Donoju. Advantage has been taken of the impression made by these libels to circulate others, in which the old stories are repeated about the outrages committed by Sir John Moore’s army in Galicia; to endeavor to irritate the public mind about our still keeping garrisons in Cadiz and Carthagena, and particularly in Ccuta; to exaggerate the conduct of our traders in South America, and every little concern of a master of a ship who may behave ill in a Spanish port; each of which is represented as an attack upon the sovereign authority of the Spanish nation.
‘ I believe these libels all proceed from the same source, the Government, their immediate servants and officers; and although I have no reason to believe that they have as yet made any impression on the nation at large, they certainly have upon the officers of the Government, and even upon the principal officers of the army. These persons must sec that, if the libels are not written or encouraged by the Government, they are at least not discouraged: they know that we are odious to the Government, and they treat us accordingly.
* The Spanish troops plunder every thing they approach ; neither their own nor our magazines are sacred. But, till lately, there was some semblance of inquiry, and of a desire to punish the offenders: lately these acts of disorder have been left entirely unnoticed, till I have interfered with my authority as Commander in Chief of the Spanish army to enforce it. The civil magistrates in the country have not only refused us assistance, but have positively ordered the inhabitants not to give it for payment; and where robberies have been discovered, and property proved to belong to the Commissariat, the law has been violated, and possession withheld. This was the case lately at Tolosa.
‘ Then, what is more extraordinary, and more difficult to understand, is a transaction which lately occurred at Fuenterrabia. In the arrangement of the cantonments, and station for general hospitals, it was settled that the British and Portuguese hospitals should go to that town. There is a building there which had been a Spanish hospital; and the Spanish authority, who gave it over to our person, who was to have charge of the hospital, wanted to carry off, in order to burn as firewood, the boards, &c., which are the beds, in order that our soldiers might not have the use of them : and these are the people to whom we have given medicines, instruments, &c., whose wounded and sick we have taken into our hospitals, &c., and to whom we have rendered every service in our power, after having recovered their country from the enemy!
‘ I beg your Lordship to observe, that these persons are not the people of Spain, but the officers of the Government, who would not dare to conduct themselves in this manner, if they did not know that their conduct was agreeable to their employers. If the spirit is not checked, however; if we do not show that we are sensible of the injury done to our characters, and of the injustice and unfriendly nature of such proceedings, we must expect that the people at large will soon behave towards us in the same manner, and that we shall have no friend, or none who will dare to avow himself as such, in Spain.
‘ I will now request your Lordship to consider what will be the consequence of this state of affairs, supposing that any reverse was to happen; or that, in consequence of an aggravation of these injuries and insults, and of this unfriendly conduct, or for any other reason, you were to think it proper to withdraw your army. I think I should experience great difficulty in retiring through Spain into Portugal, the Spanish people being hostile, from the peculiar nature of our equipments; and I think I might be able to embark the army at Pasages, in spite of all the French and Spanish armies united. But I should be much more certain of getting clear off, as we ought, if we had possession
of San Sebastian; and this view of the subject is the motive for the advice I am about to give you, as the remedy for the evils with which I have made you acquainted.
‘ First, then, I recommend to you to alter the nature of your political relations with Spain, and to have nothing here but a Charge d Affaires. My brother is of the same opinion as I am upon this point.
‘ Secondly; I recommend to you to complain seriously of the conduct of the Government and their servants; to remind them that Cadiz, Carthagena, and I believe Ceuta, were garrisoned by British troops at their earnest request; and that the troops were not sent to the two former till the Government agreed to certain conditions; and that, if our troops had not garrisoned the last, the place would, before now, have been in the hands of the Moors.
‘ Thirdly; I recommend to you to demand, as security for the safety of the King’s troops, against the criminal disposition of the Government, and of those in authority under them, that a British garrison should be admitted into San Sebastian, giving notice that, unless this demand were complied with, the troops should be withdrawn.
‘ Fourthly ; I recommend to you to withdraw the troops if this demand be not complied with, be the consequences what they may, and to be prepared accordingly. You may rely upon this, that if you take a firm, decided line, and show your determination to go through with it, you will have the Spanish nation with you, you will bring the Government to their senses, and you will put an end at once to all the petty cabals and counteraction existing at the present moment, and you will not be under the necessity of bringing matters to extremities. If you take any other than a decided line, and one which, in its consequences, will involve them in ruin, you may depend upon it you will gain nothing, and will only make matters worse.
‘ I recommend these measures to you, whatever may be the decision respecting my command of the army. They are probably the more necessary if I should keep the command. The truth is, that a crisis is approaching in our connexion with Spain; and if you do not bring the Government and nation to their senses before they go too far, you will inevitably lose all the advantages which you might expect from the services rendered to them.
• Believe me, &c.
• Earl Bathurst. ‘ ‘ Wellington.
To Earl Bathurst.
‘ My Dear Lord, ‘ St. Jean de Luz, 1st Dec., 1813.
‘ Since I wrote to you on the 28th of November, I have received letters from my brother of the 22nd from Cadiz, which tend to show, that there is an inclination in the Cortes to get rid of the existing Government, principally on account of their conduct towards us; that the confidential intercourse with the anti-democratic party has been revived, and that there is the appearance of a better disposition than I had supposed to exist.
‘ Although I am quite certain that nothing can ever be done with the Spaniards excepting by coming to extremities with them, I am very averse that there should be the appearance of difference of opinion just at this moment here, which is the cradle of the new spirit of resistance to France, if it can be avoided; and I therefore recommend, either that you should not send the orders which I suggested in my letter of the 27th November, or that you should leave to our discretion here, either to carry them into execution or not, and to select the moment for carrying them into execution.
‘ I recommended to you to recall the Ambassador, not only to show the world that you disapproved of the democratic system, on which the Spanish Government were acting, but because he has in fact for many months possessed no influence whatever over the councils of Spain ; and to have an Ambassador residing with such people, under such circumstances, was, in my opinion, degrading to the national character. I was besides in hopes that, as this measure would be an indication of coolness on the part of the British Government, it would occasion a desire in the Cortes to change those councils which had been the cause of this coolness.
‘ I believe the effect has been produced very much by the language I held about the San Sebastian libels, viz., that I never would have entered Spain if a servant of the Government had published a libel, calling upon the people to rise, to revenge the conduct of the British army, even supposing the complaints of that conduct had been well founded; and that it would rest with the British Government to determine what should be done under existing circumstances. But as the effect has been produced, as confidential intercourse has been revived, and as there are symptoms of restored influence, it is better that we should not deprive ourselves of the advantage of my brother’s experience among these people.
‘ I expect at every moment to receive your permission to withdraw the garrison of Cadiz, when I will again give them a hint that Spain has an interest in refraining from insulting the British Government, and in keeping well with Great Britain, which I hope will have some effect; at the same time that I shall take that opportunity of making public the truth, viz., that the Spanish Government entreated to have garrisons in Cadiz and Carthagena, and actually consented to certain conditions before I would allow the troops to land at cither.
‘ In regard to San Sebastian, I want it only in the apprehension of the continued unfriendly conduct of the Government and their officers, and of the probability that the people may at last have the same sentiments, particularly in case of a reverse. I should prefer not to garrison the place if there should be no ground for such apprehension. Remember, however, that if you ask to garrison San Sebastian, you must be prepared to go to extremities in case of refusal.
‘ Believe me, &c. ‘ Earl Bathurst. ‘ ‘ Wellington.
To General Don Manuel Freyre. ‘ Sir, ‘ St. Jean de Luz, 31st Dec., 1813.
‘ I received yesterday your Excellency’s letter of the 19th instant, in which you enclosed the copy of a report and its enclosures, which you had received from the officer commanding at San Sebastian, being the correspondence between the Alcalde of that town and the Governor.
‘ After the full justification of the British and Portuguese artillerymen from all blame in this transaction, and against the charges of the Alcalde against both artillerymen and their officers, it is useless for me to do more than to thank you for the communication of those papers.
‘ I enclose you the copy of the proceedings of the Court of Inquiry, and reports which I have received on this subject, from which you will see additional grounds for believing that the misfortune was accidental ; that there was no irregularity whatever; that all fires had been extinguished at the usual hour ; and that every thing that was possible was done to save the building.
‘ I have the honor to be, &c. ‘ Don Manuel Freyre.’ ‘ “wellington.
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